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W
hat links all of us who are committed to community development is a 
belief in the power of the idea that capital employed for social purposes 
can multiply itself many times over. In the past two decades, that belief has 
birthed a field in community investing unlike anything else in the world. 
Consider how far we’ve come. Twenty years ago, LISC and the Enterprise Foundation 
were just getting started and were still finding their way in the world. My organization, the 
Low-Income Investment Fund (LIIF), had just been incorporated and had only $200,000 in 
capital under management. The community capital movement was still more an idea than 
reality. 
Twenty years ago, I was also a young program officer at the Ford Foundation. I made 
one of my first PRIs, a $500,000 loan, to the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) and 
clearly remember my investment recommendation to the officers of the Foundation: “ICE 
is creating a network of community-based loan funds and this PRI will be used to seed their 
creation.” Then, boasting a bit about the scale of this new community loan fund network, I 
said, “There are twelve of these organizations across the country with $27 million in capital.” 
At that time, $27 million nationwide seemed like a large and impressive number.
Today, we know that there are more than five hundred community loan funds, with $18 
billion in capital nationwide. LIIF now manages $2.5 billion in assets and has helped to 
create affordable housing for the working poor; special needs housing and services for the 
homeless; housing for victims of domestic violence and people with disabilities; unique 
home-ownership developments; and community facilities such as child-care centers and 
charter schools. At the same time, in twenty years, this half a billion dollars in lending has 
produced losses of only $192,000: a capital-loss rate of only 0.12 percent, or one-eighth of 
one percent.
In many ways, we succeeded beyond our expectations, and our success has ignited new 
ambitions. Now we are focused on creating scale in our industry and on building a bridge 
between private-capital markets and poor communities. 
The private-sector capital most accessible to us, the banking industry motivated by the 
Community Reinvestment Act, is regulated. It simply cannot do the types of loans that we 
do and still pass muster with its auditors and regulators. So, two major trends are combining 
at once: we need the scale the private sector offers, but we are too weird and funky, or, in 
polite terms, “nonconforming,” to be accepted by the private sector.
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To meet the capital demands of our borrowers, we must take the weird, funky, noncon-
forming community loans and make them palatable to the capital markets, and we are 
pursuing many strategies to accomplish this.  For example, a number of CDFIs and nonprofit 
developers have banded together through the Housing Partnership Network to create a $100 
million relationship with Freddie Mac where we can sell our projects. We are looking for 
funds to serve as the first loss cushion. Whether we succeed is largely a function of our ability 
to raise these risk-absorbing funds. Likewise, LIIF is working with Fannie Mae on a large-scale 
transaction that does the same thing.
Another example is the $35 million loan pool that LIIF is now assembling for charter 
schools. We are using a $1.7 million Department of Education grant as the cushion against 
losses, though it could just as easily have been funds from a foundation or the proposed 
Affordable Housing Fund, which was included in GSE reform legislation last year. That’s a 
leverage ratio of more than 20 to 1. Citigroup is our lead investor in the pool; Prudential, 
Merrill Lynch, and LISC are involved, as is the Annie E. Casey Foundation. The ultimate 
result of this collaboration will be thousands of low-income kids attending high-performing 
schools and receiving a quality education. The financial leverage in this example is huge. The 
human capital leverage can be measured only in the lives of the kids touched by the chance 
to have a high-quality education that prepares them to enter the economy of the informa-
tion age.
Another potentially revolutionary strategy would have the GSEs take the lead in helping 
to securitize community-development loan pools, which could trigger a flood of new capital 
for community development. A GSE could make a commitment to buy pools of loans 
from high-performing CDFIs like LIIF, the Enterprise Foundation, the Reinvestment Fund, 
Self-Help, and LISC, all of which finance housing for extremely low-income populations. 
These loans are considered “nonconforming” because they do not meet the highly structured 
traditional underwriting standards of the banking community or the GSEs. Yet they perform 
like the highest-quality assets. While these loans are perceived as risky, the truth is that our 
industry has a loss rate of less than one percent with more than twenty years of history 
behind us.
Here’s how the idea would work. The GSE would agree in advance to buy, say, $100 
million of these loans and would establish a special loss reserve pool or “credit enhance-
ment” from the GSE Affordable Housing Fund. The GSE would then pool these funds into a 
mortgage-backed security and provide a credit enhancement that would confer its AAA bond 
rating on the pooled security. This security could then be sold in the capital markets.
It is important to point out that while any individual loan may bear some risk, the expo-
sure of the GSE would be limited and highly diversified. First, the organizations selling the 
loans would likely provide a top-loss guarantee, probably five percent. We would be on the 
hook, ensuring disciplined lending. Second, these loans all have substantial collateral, which 
could be used to absorb capital losses. And finally, the special loan loss reserve established 
by the GSE would be tapped before there is any impact on the GSE. Given that the historic 
loss rate on these portfolios is less than 1 percent, it is unlikely that any losses would trickle 
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down to the GSE. The leveraging potential is enormous. The social return on investment is 
enormous.
LIIF has already structured this kind of transaction in New York, working with the State 
of New York Mortgage Agency (SONYMA). LIIF established a guarantee of $260,000 to 
leverage SONYMA insurance for a $2.6 million loan to a homeless shelter in New York 
City. The investor was the United Methodist Pension Fund. Given the AA credit enhance-
ment from SONYMA, LIIF induced even the most hard-boiled, profit-oriented firm on Wall 
Street to invest in a homeless shelter on Staten Island. In this example, you see the real power 
of leveraging and credit enhancement. You see a way to multiply the bang for the buck.
These kinds of transactions would have enormous positive implications for distressed 
communities across America. GSE securitization would provide our institutions with much-
needed capital liquidity to be able to make greater volumes of loans for deeply targeted 
housing. With the GSE credit rating in place, it would bring the longest terms (30 years) and 
the best prices of the capital markets to bear in a highly targeted project in a safe and sound 
fashion. This idea would yield leveraging of perhaps $100 for every dollar committed, given 
our record of capital losses. The cost to the public at the end of the day would be negligible, 
yet the community benefits would be tremendous.
Together, we have proved that the idea of investing capital for social purposes works. 
We have proved that the idea of investing in communities works. We have taken an idea 
that started in the 1960s with action in the streets and transformed it into capital invested 
in neighborhoods throughout this country. Now we need to take the next step: scale and 
leverage. 
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